Actually, I think most people accept the existence of qualia.
People have managed to avert their eyes and hope for the best.
Although I'm Australian, I find myself much more in sympathy with the Austrian version!
What does it mean, exactly, for a given system to be a ""neural correlate of consciousness""?
It probably helps that my background is in the sciences and I can speak the scientists' language.
There's certainly nothing original about the observation that conscious experience poses a hard problem.
Anyway, there is a lot of really interesting work going on in the neuroscience and psychology of consciousness, and I would love to see philosophers become more closely involved with this.
Here, the broader issues are already familiar, and discussion has focused at a more sophisticated and detailed level. Within the philosophy of mind, the problem of consciousness is no big news.
I never expected this to catch on in the way it did! Of course similar observations have been made by any number of people, and the distinction is obvious to anyone who thinks about the subject a little.
Even when I was studying mathematics, physics, and computer science, it always seemed that the problem of consciousness was about the most interesting problem out there for science to come to grips with.